Hong Kong Business Advisory - U.S. Department of State
On September 6, the U.S. Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Treasury jointly released an updated (last issued in July 2021), warning U.S. businesses about risks to their operations and activities in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong Business Advisory Many of these risks stem from the implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, also known as the National Security Law (NSL), and the March 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNS Ordinance or “Article 23”). These laws further erode fundamental freedoms and protections for human rights in Hong Kong.
Businesses should be aware that the risks they face in the PRC are now increasingly present in Hong Kong. The NSL, the SNS Ordinance, and actions by PRC and Hong Kong authorities, such as the imposition of bounties, may negatively affect businesses’ staff, finances, legal compliance, reputation, and operations. This updated business advisory provides companies with information that can assist them in making informed business decisions and properly assessing risk.
The advisory highlights the following:
• Businesses operating in Hong Kong, as well as individuals conducting business on such companies’ behalf, are subject to the broad and vague provisions of the NSL and the SNS Ordinance.
• Businesses should be aware that the extraterritorial application of the SNS Ordinance could impact businesses and individuals outside Hong Kong.
• Businesses operating in Hong Kong face potential legal, regulatory, operational, financial, and reputational risks, including of increased scrutiny, potential financial penalties, and legal actions for perceived violations of the NSL or the SNS Ordinance.
• Businesses operating in Hong Kong may face conflicting jurisdictional requirements and liability in connection with sanctions compliance efforts. Failure to adhere to U.S. sanctions can result in civil and criminal penalties under U.S. law.
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List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor - U.S. Department of Labor
The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) maintains a list of goods and their source countries which it has reason to believe are produced by child labor or forced labor in violation of international standards, as required under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005 and subsequent reauthorizations. The List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor comprises 204 goods from 82 countries and areas, as of September 5, 2024.
ILAB maintains the List primarily to raise public awareness about forced labor and child labor around the world and to promote efforts to combat them; it is not intended to be punitive, but rather to serve as a catalyst for more strategic and focused coordination and collaboration among those working to address these problems.
Publication of the List has resulted in new opportunities for ILAB to engage with foreign governments to combat forced labor and child labor. It is also a valuable resource for researchers, advocacy organizations and companies wishing to carry out risk assessments and engage in due diligence on labor rights in their supply chains.
Read More ››
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Federal Register Notices:
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Non-Refillable Steel Cylinders From the People's Republic of China: Rescission of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2023
• Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited Third Sunset Review of the Countervailing Duty Order
• Granular Polytetrafluoroethylene Resin From India: Final Results of the Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2021-2022
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Certain Pre-Stretched Synthetic Braiding Hair and Packaging Therefor; Notice of Institution of Investigation
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Mattresses From India, Kosovo, Mexico, and Spain: Antidumping Duty Orders
• Circular Welded Carbon Steel Standard Pipe and Tube Products From the Republic of Türkiye; Welded Line Pipe From the Republic of Türkiye; Certain Oil Tubular Goods From the Republic of Türkiye; and Large Diameter Welded Pipe From the Republic of Türkiye: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Changed Circumstances Reviews
• Stainless Steel Bar From India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Ferrosilicon From the Republic of Kazakhstan: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Certain Low Speed Personal Transportation Vehicles From the People's Republic of China: Postponement of Preliminary Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation
• Ferrosilicon From Brazil: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Preliminary Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination in Part, and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Circular Welded Carbon Steel Standard Pipe and Tube Products From the Republic of Türkiye; Welded Line Pipe From the Republic of Türkiye; Certain Oil Tubular Goods From the Republic of Türkiye; and Large Diameter Welded Pipe From the Republic of Türkiye: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Changed Circumstances Review
• Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Determinations, Investigations, etc.: Certain High Chrome Cast Iron Grinding Media From India: Postponement of Preliminary Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate Products From the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate From the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited Third Sunset Review of the Antidumping Duty Order
• Laminated Woven Sacks From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Review of the Countervailing Duty Order
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Netherlands, South Africa, Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam; Institution of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations and Scheduling of Preliminary Phase Investigations
• Investigations; Determinations, Modifications, and Rulings, etc.: Plastic Decorative Ribbon From China
• Certain Semiconductor Devices, and Methods of Manufacturing Same and Products Containing the Same; Notice of a Commission Determination To Review a Final Initial Determination Finding a Violation of Section 337; Request for Written Submissions on the Issues Under Review and on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Certain Metal Lockers and Parts Thereof From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results and Intent To Rescind, in Part, of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Glycine From India, Japan, and Thailand: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Reviews of the Antidumping Duty Orders
• Notice of Scope Ruling Applications Filed in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings
• Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Investigations, Orders, or Reviews: Utility Scale Wind Towers From Malaysia: Preliminary Results and Preliminary Partial Rescission of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 2022
• Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags From Malaysia: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Carbazole Violet Pigment 23 From India: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, and Preliminary Determination of No Shipments; 2022-2023
• Steel Propane Cylinders From Thailand: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Utility Scale Wind Towers From the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Results and Rescission of Review, in Part, of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Certain Steel Nails From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Intent To Rescind, in Part; 2022-2023
• Finished Carbon Steel Flanges From India: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, and Rescission, in Part; 2022-202
• Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand From the United Arab Emirates: Initiation of Antidumping Duty New Shipper Review
• Certain Epoxy Resins From India: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Certain Epoxy Resins From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Certain Cased Pencils From the People's Republic of China: Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Certain Epoxy Resins From Taiwan: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Glycine From India and the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Expedited First Sunset Reviews of the Countervailing Duty Orders
• Finished Carbon Steel Flanges From India: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Preliminary Intent To Rescind, in Part; 2022
• Certain Metal Lockers and Parts Thereof From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results, Preliminary Determination of No Shipments, and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results and Preliminary Determination of No Shipments; 2022
• 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid From India: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Silicon Metal From Malaysia: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2022-2023
• Certain Epoxy Resins From the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, Preliminary Negative Critical Circumstances Determination and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination
• Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils From the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Results and Intent To Rescind, in Part, of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2022
• Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube From Mexico: Preliminary Results and Intent To Rescind, in Part, of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
• Seamless Carbon and Alloy Steel Standard, Line, and Pressure Pipe From Ukraine: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2022-2023
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CSMS # 62097992 - Marking Requirements for Repackaged Prescription Medication Imported into the United States - CBP
On June 14, 2024, Regulations and Rulings issued an internal advice decision, HQ H283420, concerning country of origin marking requirements for repackaged prescription medication Imported into the United States. This ruling may be accessed on the Customs Rulings Online Search System (CROSS) at the following link: https://rulings.cbp.gov/home.
Pursuant to the decision, all repackaged medications sold to retail customers will be required to be marked with the country of origin. The Fact Sheet referenced and found at the link directly below discusses the country of origin marking requirements applicable to prescription medication imported into the United States: https://www.cbp.gov/document/fact-sheets/marking-prescription-drugs-retail-sale-factsheet.
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DHS Establishes United States-United Kingdom-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Cooperation Group (SCRCG) to Tackle Supply Chain Threats - Department of Homeland Security
Three nations will develop an early warning pilot to assess disruptions to supply chains in the telecommunications sector
WASHINGTON – This week, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United Kingdom (U.K.)’s Department for Business and Trade of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia’s Department of Industry, Science, and Resources established the United States-United Kingdom-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Cooperation Group to enhance efforts to combat threats to critical supply chains.
The Supply Chain Resilience Cooperation Group will develop an early warning pilot focused on the telecommunications sector. This sector, including satellite and subsea communications, is critical to the shared economic security of the three participating nations. The pilot program will identify and monitor potential disruptions to supply chains in the telecommunications sector. It will also enhance global understanding of the vulnerabilities in the sector and develop communications channels for sharing this information and facilitating cooperative responses to disruptions.
Telecommunications infrastructure is vital to the distribution of public safety information, emergency services, and the day to day lives of many citizens. For example, undersea fiberoptic cables carry over 95% of transoceanic data traffic without which smartphones, financial networks, and communications systems would cease to function reliably.
“The resilience of our critical supply chains is a homeland security and economic security imperative,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “Collaboration with international partners allows us to anticipate and mitigate disruptions before they occur. Our new U.S.-U.K.-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Cooperation Group will help ensure that our communities continue to have the essential goods and services they need, when they need them.”
The U.K. and Australia are the first countries to formalize cooperation with DHS’ Supply Chain Resilience Center through a Memorandum of Understanding. Established in 2023, the Supply Chain Resilience Center works to analyze supply chain vulnerabilities alongside federal partners and private sector stakeholders to mitigate potential disruptions, ensuring the delivery of essential goods and services to American citizens.
The U.K’s Economic Security and Supply Chain Resilience Directorate, housed in the Department for Business and Trade, oversees efforts to mitigate supply-side risks to the U.K. economy and support greater long-term resilience. Australia’s Office of Supply Chain Resilience, housed in the Department for Industry, Science, and Resources, focuses on mitigating supply chain vulnerabilities and ensuring ongoing access to essential goods and services. These offices participating in the Memorandum of Understanding are not direct DHS counterparts, but their mission areas include significant overlap with respect to supply chain resilience issues. This partnership reflects the multifaceted nature of supply chain challenges and draws on the wide-ranging expertise represented between the three participants.
“The United States has recently felt effects of supply chain disruptions around the world, which is why working with our allies to secure our supply chains is more critical than ever,” said Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers. “By establishing the U.S.- U.K.-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Cooperation Group and developing our early warning system, we are setting the groundwork to anticipate supply chain disruptions and build resilience before our nations are affected by shortages of critical goods.”
“Strong supply chains are essential for our economic security, and we cannot rely purely on the invisible hand of the market to deliver them,” said U.K. Minister for Trade Policy and Economic Security Douglas Alexander. “Improved cooperation between our three nations will help us to identify and mitigate disruption to supply chains and better support U.K. businesses trading internationally.”
The Supply Chain Resilience Center, established in November 2023, serves as a hub for key U.S. government and industry partners to come together to anticipate, analyze, and plan for potential supply chain disruptions. It is supported by personnel from DHS Headquarters, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) who bring extensive supply chain knowledge and expertise, and who are in regular contact with industry and other stakeholders.
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Three Ways to Protect the Personal Info on Your Phone - Federal Trade Commission
Imagine carrying a written copy of all your conversations with you everywhere you went. Or copies of your account numbers, usernames, and passwords. Or all the photos and videos you’ve ever taken. I bet you’d do just about everything in your power to protect all that valuable information. Well, your mobile phone holds all that stuff — and maybe more. Are you doing everything in your power to keep it from ending up in the wrong hands? Here are three things you can do today to protect the personal information on your phone.
1. Lock it. Keep prying eyes out of your phone by setting it to automatically lock when you’re not using it and create a PIN or passcode to unlock it. Longer passcodes are better, so use at least six digits. After you’ve set it up, you might be able to unlock your phone with your fingerprint, your face, or your iris.
Here's how to set it up >
2. Update it. Your operating system has security features built into it. And phone manufacturers regularly push out free updates to protect you against security threats. Set your phone to automatically update the operating system to stay up with the latest protections.
Here’s how to update your phone >
Bonus: Update your apps, too. And delete any apps you don’t use.
3. Back it up. The convenience and portability of our phone puts it in peril. We might break or lose it. Or an opportunistic criminal might steal it. Back up your phone to the cloud or an external drive. That way you can recover your information if something goes wrong. And turn on the feature that helps you track a lost or stolen phone – it also lets you remotely lock or erase your phone if someone steals it, or you can’t find it.
Here’s how to back up your phone >
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USITC Makes Determination in Five-Year (Sunset) Reviews Concerning Plastic Decorative Ribbon from China - USITC
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) today determined that revoking the existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on plastic decorative ribbon from China would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time.
As a result of the Commission’s affirmative determination, the existing orders on imports of these products from China will remain in place.
Commissioners David S. Johanson, Rhonda K. Schmidtlein, and Jason E. Kearns voted in the affirmative. Chair Amy A. Karpel did not participate in the vote.
Today’s action comes under the five-year (sunset) review process required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See the attached page for background on these five-year (sunset) reviews.
The Commission’s public report Plastic Decorative Ribbon from China (Inv. Nos. 701-TA-592 and 731-TA-1400 (Review), USITC Publication 5541, September 2024) will contain the views of the Commission and information developed during the reviews.
The report will be available by October 4, 2024; when available, it may be accessed on the USITC website at: https://www.usitc.gov/commission_publications_library.
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BACKGROUND
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act requires the Department of Commerce to revoke an antidumping or countervailing duty order, or terminate a suspension agreement, after five years unless the Department of Commerce and the USITC determine that revoking the order or terminating the suspension agreement would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidies (Commerce) and of material injury (USITC) within a reasonably foreseeable time.
The Commission’s institution notice in five-year reviews requests that interested parties file responses with the Commission concerning the likely effects of revoking the order under review as well as other information. Generally within 95 days from institution, the Commission will determine whether the responses it has received reflect an adequate or inadequate level of interest in a full review. If responses to the USITC’s notice of institution are adequate, or if other circumstances warrant a full review, the Commission conducts a full review, which includes a public hearing and issuance of questionnaires.
The Commission generally does not hold a hearing or conduct further investigative activities in expedited reviews. Commissioners base their injury determination in expedited reviews on the facts available, including the Commission’s prior injury and review determinations, responses received to its notice of institution, data collected by staff in connection with the reviews, and information provided by the Department of Commerce.
The five-year (sunset) reviews concerning Plastic Decorative Ribbon from China were instituted on February 1, 2024.
On May 6, 2024, the Commission determined to conduct expedited five-year reviews. Chair Amy A. Karpel and Commissioners David S. Johanson, Rhonda K. Schmidtlein, and Jason E. Kearns concluded that the domestic interested party group responses were adequate, and the respondent interested party group responses were inadequate, and voted for expedited reviews.
A record of the Commission’s vote to conduct expedited reviews is available on the investigations page for Plastic Decorative Ribbon from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-592 and 731-TA-1400 (Review)..
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Pakistani National Charged for Plotting Terrorist Attack in New York City in Support of ISIS - Department of Justice
Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, also known as Shazeb Jadoon, Attempted to Enter the United States to Carry Out a Mass Shooting at a Jewish Center in New York City
Note: View the complaint here.
A Pakistani citizen residing in Canada, Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, 20, also known as Shahzeb Jadoon, was arrested on Sept. 4 in Canada in connection with a complaint filed in the Southern District of New York. Khan was charged with attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO), the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
“The defendant is alleged to have planned a terrorist attack in New York City around October 7th of this year with the stated goal of slaughtering, in the name of ISIS, as many Jewish people as possible,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “Thanks to the investigative work of the FBI, and the quick action of our Canadian law enforcement partners, the defendant was taken into custody. As I said to Canada’s Minister of Public Safety yesterday, we are deeply grateful to our Canadian partners for their critical law enforcement actions in this matter. Jewish communities — like all communities in this country — should not have to fear that they will be targeted by a hate-fueled terrorist attack. The Justice Department will continue to work closely with our domestic and international partners to aggressively counter the threat posed by ISIS and other terrorist organizations and their supporters.”
“The defendant was allegedly determined to kill Jewish people here in the United States, nearly one year after Hamas’ horrific attack on Israel. This investigation was led by the FBI, and I am proud of the terrific work by the FBI team and our partners to disrupt Khan's plan.” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “The FBI will continue to work closely with our partners to investigate and hold accountable those who seek to commit violence in the name of ISIS or other terrorist organizations. Fighting terrorism remains the FBI’s top priority.”
As alleged in the complaint, Khan, who resided in Canada, attempted to travel from Canada to New York City, where he intended to use automatic and semi-automatic weapons to carry out a mass shooting in support of ISIS at a Jewish center in Brooklyn, New York. Khan began posting on social media and communicating with others on an encrypted messaging application about his support for ISIS in or about November 2023, when, among other things, Khan distributed ISIS propaganda videos and literature. Subsequently, Khan began communicating with two undercover law enforcement officers (collectively, the UCs).
During those conversations, Khan confirmed that he and a U.S.-based ISIS supporter (Associate-1) had been planning to carry out an attack in a particular U.S. city (City-1). Among other things, Khan said that he had been actively attempting to create “a real offline cell” of ISIS supporters to carry out a “coordinated assault” in City-1 using AR-style rifles to “target[] Israeli Jewish chabads . . . scattered all around [City-1].” During subsequent conversations, Khan repeatedly instructed the UCs to obtain AR-style assault rifles, ammunition, and other materials to carry out the attacks, and identified the specific locations in City-1 where the attacks would take place. Khan also provided details about how he would cross the border from Canada into the United States to conduct the attacks. During these conversations with the UCs, Khan emphasized that “Oct 7th and oct 11th are the best days for targeting the jews” because “oct 7 they will surely have some protests and oct 11 is yom.kippur.”
On or about Aug. 20, Khan changed his target location from City-1 to New York City. After initially suggesting certain neighborhoods in New York City to the UCs, Khan decided to target Location-1, a Jewish center located in Brooklyn, New York. Khan told the UCs that he planned to carry out this attack on or around Oct. 7, 2024 — which Khan recognized as the one-year anniversary of the brutal terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas, a designated FTO, which, on Oct. 7, 2023, launched a wave of violent, large-scale terrorist attacks in Israel. In support of his choice of New York City as his target location, Khan boasted that “New york is perfect to target jews” because it has the “largest Jewish population In america” and therefore, “even if we dont attack a[n] Event[,] we could rack up easily a lot of jews.” Khan proclaimed that “we are going to nyc to slaughter them,” and sent a photograph of the specific area inside of Location-1 where he planned to carry out the attack.
Thereafter, Khan continued to urge the UCs to acquire AR-style rifles, ammunition, and other equipment for his attack, including “some good hunting [knives] so we can slit their throats.” Khan repeatedly reiterated his desire to carry out the attack in support of ISIS, and discussed planning for the attack, including by identifying rental properties close to Location-1 and paying for a human smuggler to help him reach and cross the border from Canada into the United States. During one communication, Khan noted that “if we succeed with our plan this would be the largest Attack on US soil since 9/11.”
On or about Sept. 4, as Khan said he planned to do in connection with his attack, Khan attempted to reach the U.S-Canada border. To do so, Khan used three separate cars to travel across Canada towards the United States, before he was stopped in or around Ormstown, Canada, approximately 12 miles from the U.S.-Canada border.
Khan is charged with one count of attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
The FBI New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles Field Offices are investigating the case. The Justice Department is grateful to Canadian law enforcement for their actions in this matter. The Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division is seeking the extradition of Khan from Canada.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kaylan E. Lasky and David J. Robles for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorney Kevin C. Nunnally of the Justice Department’s National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.
A complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
Updated September 6, 2024