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Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Polyester Textured Yarn from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam - Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP

I. Type of Action: Antidumping Duty (“AD”):  Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

II. Product:

The merchandise covered by this Petition is polyester textured yarn.  Polyester textured yarn is a type of synthetic multifilament yarn that is manufactured from polyester (polyethylene terephthalate or “PET”).  Specifically excluded from this definition are textured yarns manufactured from materials other than polyester (such as nylon, polypropylene, and polyethylene).

The scope of the imported merchandise that Petitioners intend to cover in this investigation is as follows:

The merchandise covered by these petitions, polyester textured yarn, is synthetic multifilament yarn that is manufactured from polyester (polyethylene terephthalate).  Polyester textured yarn is produced through a texturing process, which imparts special properties to the filaments of the yarn, including stretch, bulk, strength, moisture absorption, insulation, and the appearance of a natural fiber.  This scope includes all forms of polyester textured yarn, regardless of surface texture or appearance, yarn density and thickness (as measured in denier), number of filaments, number of plies, finish (luster), cross section, color, dye method, texturing method, or packing method (such as spindles, tubes, or beams).

III. HTS classifications:

The merchandise subject to these petitions is properly classified under subheadings 5402.33.3000 and 5402.33.6000 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).  Merchandise may also be entered under HTSUS 5402.52.00.  Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for convenience and customs purposes, the written description of the merchandise is dispositive.

IV. Date of Filing: October 28, 2020

V. Petitioners: Unifi Manufacturing, Inc. and Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, America, domestic producers of polyester textured yarn.

VI. Foreign Producers/Exporters:

Please contact our office for a list filed with the petition.

VII. US Importers named:

Please contact our office for a list filed with the petition.

VIII. Alleged Dumping Margins:

Indonesia: 15.51%

Malaysia: 75.13%

Thailand: 56.80%

Vietnam: 42.29%

IX. Comments:

A.  Projected date of ITC Preliminary Conference: November 18, 2020.

B.  The earliest theoretical date for retroactive suspension of liquidation for the AD is January 6, 2021.

Please contact our office for a complete projected schedule for the AD investigation.

C.  Volume and Value of Imports:

Please contact our office for a summary of the data filed with the petition.

If you have questions regarding how this investigation may impact future imports of scope merchandise or whether a particular product is within the scope of the investigation, please contact one of our attorneys.

OTEXA:  Announcements - OTEXA

10/26/2020 – The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a new fraud reporting platform for consumers. Go to Report Fraud for more information or to submit reports to the FTC about scams, frauds, and bad business practices, including deceptive labeling practices. The new site replaces the FTC Complaint Assistant.


Port Authority to Impose Fine for Failure to Wear Mask or Face Covering at Agency Facilities -  NY/NJ Port of Authority

Travelers Who Fail to Wear a Mask or Face Covering Subject to Recommended $50 Fine Starting Monday, November 2 

Face Coverings Are Required at Port Authority Facilities – Including Airport Terminals, PATH Stations and Trains, AirTrain Stations and Trains, Midtown Bus Terminal, GWB Bus Station and Oculus – to Help Protect Fellow Passengers and Employees from the Spread of COVID-19 

Today the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey announced that it will impose a fine for failure to wear a mask or face covering appropriately in Port Authority facilities. Travelers could be liable for the new recommended fine of $50 effective Monday, November 2, 2020. This move is part of agency’s commitment to supporting the New York and New Jersey state requirements on mask wearing in transportation facilities. 

The Port Authority will continue to put primary emphasis on voluntary compliance. Since March, the agency has used public announcements, posters and digital signage, mask giveaways and education days, and one-on-one interaction to make travelers aware of the health and safety protocols established by the states of New York and New Jersey in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the Port Authority’s COVID-19 response, please visit:


Federal Register Notices:


CBP Officers in Boston Seize Nearly $1M in Counterfeit Watches - U.S. Customs & Border Protection

BOSTON – On October 23, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers in Boston seized three counterfeit Rolex watches and one counterfeit Richard Mille watch originating from Hong Kong. The shipment of watches was destined to an individual in the Boston area. 

Officers seized the shipment and coordinated with import specialists at CBP’s Centers of Excellence and Expertise (CEE) to determine if the watches were counterfeit. Had the watches been genuine they would have been valued at $923,000.

“Counterfeit goods threaten American consumers, brands and our economy,” said Jason Jalbert, Acting Area Port Director – Boston. “The proceeds from illicit goods are known to fund criminal activities and organized crime, which is why CBP remains focused on intercepting these items.” 

CBP established an educational initiative to raise consumer awareness about the consequences and dangers that are often associated with the purchase of counterfeit and pirated goods. Information about the Truth Behind Counterfeits public awareness campaign can be found at

CBP conducts operations at ports of entry throughout the United States, and regularly screens arriving international passengers and cargo for narcotics, weapons, and other restricted or prohibited products. CBP strives to serve as the premier law enforcement agency enhancing the Nation’s safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration.


USTR and USDA Release Report on Agricultural Trade between the United States and China - U.S. Trade Representative

Washington, DC – The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) today issued a report highlighting the progress made to date in implementing the agricultural provisions in the U.S.-China Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement, which is delivering historic results for American agriculture.

Since the Agreement entered into force, the United States and China have addressed a multitude of structural barriers in China that had been impeding exports of U.S. food and agricultural products. To date, China has implemented at least 50 of the 57 technical commitments under the Phase One Agreement. These structural changes will benefit American farmers for decades to come. China also has substantially ramped up its purchases of U.S. agricultural products. To date, China has purchased over $23 billion in agricultural products, approximately 71% of its target under the Phase One Agreement. Highlights outlined in the report include: 

  • Corn: Outstanding sales of U.S. corn to China are at an all-time high of 8.7 million tons.
  • Soybeans: U.S. soybeans sales for marketing year 2021 are off to the strongest start in history, with outstanding sales to China double 2017 levels.
  • Sorghum: U.S. exports of sorghum to China from January to August 2020 totaled $617 million, up from $561 million for the same period in 2017.
  • Pork: U.S. pork exports to China hit an all-time record in just the first five months of 2020.
  • Beef: U.S. beef and beef products exports to China through August 2020 are already more than triple the total for 2017.

In addition to these products, USDA expects 2020 sales to China to hit record or near-record levels for numerous other U.S. agricultural products including pet food, alfalfa hay, pecans, peanuts, and prepared foods.

"This China Phase One Agreement is proof President Trump’s negotiating strategy is working. While it took China a long time to realize President Trump was serious, this deal is a huge success for the entire economy. This agreement finally levels the playing field for U.S. agriculture and is a bonanza for America’s farmers, ranchers, and producers," said U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue. "Being able to participate in this market in a more fair and equitable way has generated more sales that are supporting higher prices and strengthening the rural economy."

"President Trump delivered on his promise to confront China’s unfair trade practices and expand market opportunities for U.S. agriculture through the Phase One Agreement. Since the Agreement entered into force eight months ago, we have seen remarkable improvements in our agricultural trade relationship with China, which will benefit our farmers and ranchers for years to come," said U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.

USTR and USDA continue to work closely with the Chinese government to ensure that the Phase One Agreement is fully and properly implemented, so that access for U.S. food and agricultural products into the Chinese market can continue to expand moving forward.

The report is available here.


Treasury Sanctions Russian Government Research Institution Connected to the Triton Malware - U.S. Department of Treasury

Washington – Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated, pursuant to Section 224 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a Russian government research institution that is connected to the destructive Triton malware. The Triton malware — known also as TRISIS and HatMan in open source reporting — was designed specifically to target and manipulate industrial safety systems. Such systems provide for the safe emergency shutdown of industrial processes at critical infrastructure facilities in order to protect human life. The cyber actors behind the Triton malware have been referred to by the private cybersecurity industry as “the most dangerous threat activity publicly known.”

“The Russian Government continues to engage in dangerous cyber activities aimed at the United States and our allies,” said Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “This Administration will continue to aggressively defend the critical infrastructure of the United States from anyone attempting to disrupt it.”

In recent years, the Triton malware has been deployed against U.S. partners in the Middle East, and the hackers behind the malware have been reportedly scanning and probing U.S. facilities. The development and deployment of the Triton malware against our partners is particularly troubling given the Russian government’s involvement in malicious and dangerous cyber-enabled activities. Previous examples of Russia’s reckless activities in cyberspace include, but are not limited to: the NotPetya cyber-attack, the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history; cyber intrusions against the U.S. energy grid to potentially enable future offensive operations; the targeting of international organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the World Anti-Doping Agency; and the 2019 disruptive cyber-attack against the country of Georgia.

Triton Malware

In August 2017, a petrochemical facility in the Middle East was the target of a cyber-attack involving the Triton malware. This cyber-attack was supported by the State Research Center of the Russian Federation FGUP Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics (TsNIIKhM), a Russian government-controlled research institution that is responsible for building customized tools that enabled the attack.

The Triton malware was designed to target a specific industrial control system (ICS) controller used in some critical infrastructure facilities to initiate immediate shutdown procedures in the event of an emergency. The malware was initially deployed through phishing that targeted the petrochemical facility. Once the malware gained a foothold, its operators attempted to manipulate the facility’s ICS controllers. During the attack, the facility automatically shut down after several of the ICS controllers entered into a failed safe state, preventing the malware’s full functionality from being deployed, and prompting an investigation that ultimately led to the discovery of the malware. Researchers who investigated the cyber-attack and the malware reported that Triton was designed to give the attackers complete control of infected systems and had the capability to cause significant physical damage and loss of life. In 2019, the attackers behind the Triton malware were also reported to be scanning and probing at least 20 electric utilities in the United States for vulnerabilities.

TsNIIKhM is being designated pursuant to Section 224 of CAATSA for knowingly engaging in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation.

As a result of today’s designation, all property and interests in property of TsNIIKhM that are in or come within the possession of U.S. persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. Additionally, any entities 50 percent or more owned by one or more designated persons are also blocked. Moreover, non-U.S. persons who engage in certain transactions with TsNIIKhM may themselves be exposed to sanctions.

View identifying information on the entity designated today
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